{"id":3179,"date":"2025-10-01T12:00:00","date_gmt":"2025-10-01T10:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.oikonomia.it\/?post_type=articolo&p=3179"},"modified":"2026-04-19T17:20:01","modified_gmt":"2026-04-19T15:20:01","slug":"render-to-caesar-the-things-that-are-caesars-and-to-god-limits-and-opportunities-of-the-diplomatic-relations-between-the-holy-see-and-the-peoples-republic-of-c","status":"publish","type":"articolo","link":"https:\/\/www.oikonomia.it\/en\/2025\/ottobre\/render-to-caesar-the-things-that-are-caesars-and-to-god-limits-and-opportunities-of-the-diplomatic-relations-between-the-holy-see-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cRender to Caesar the things that are Caesar\u2019s, and to God…?\u201d Limits and Opportunities of the Diplomatic Relations between the Holy See and the People\u2019s Republic of China"},"content":{"rendered":"

I.\u00a0Abstract<\/h3>\n

In this paper I would like to analyse the diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the People\u2019s Republic of China from a theoretical point of view, placing two terms \u2013 inculturation and sinicization \u2013 into the spotlight, framing the understanding within the context of the so-called secular religions and political theology. My hypothesis is that the nature of the dialogue between the two parties could be better interpreted via this concept, rather than using the analogy of \u201cOstpolitik\u201d \u2013 the official ecclesiastical policy of the Holy See towards the Soviet bloc during the Cold War.<\/p>\n

This text is a result of the CREATE TX Programme at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, within which I had the opportunity to spend a whole semester in Rome, studying the social teaching of the Catholic Church and related disciplines. Besides, the various weekly visits to different dicasteries of the Holy See enriched my experience and helped me to build a deeper understanding of Church-related diplomatic activities. Another element of the programme was that it created personal relationships \u2013 not only in academic terms \u2013 between all the participants. I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude towards the University for providing this opportunity for us.<\/p>\n

II. Introduction<\/h3>\n

\u201cRender to Caesar the things that are Caesar\u2019s; and to God the things that are God\u2019s.\u201d[1]<\/sup>\u00a0According to the Gospel, this was Jesus Christ\u2019s response to the Pharisees when questioned about paying taxes to the emperor. This passage laid the foundation for the Western political-theoretical discourse that led to the separation of temporal (political) and transcendent (religious) powers\u2014a feature characteristic of the Western Christian world.[2]<\/sup>\u00a0Of course, this relationship has not been conflict-free throughout history, but today the issue is generally seen as settled.[3]<\/sup><\/p>\n

However, in the non-Western, non-Christian parts of the world, it remains highly contested. This includes the People’s Republic of China, where the conflict between the state-unrecognized, persecuted “underground Church” and official \u201cCatholicism\u201d is a focal issue of the Holy See’s diplomacy\u2014particularly regarding the appointment of bishops. In Catholicism this right belongs to the pope for theological reasons, but China sees it as an infringement on its own sovereignty.<\/p>\n

During my research I analysed how the two entities engage in international relations\u2014within the context of global politics\u2014and traced the development of Chinese Christianity and China\u2013Holy See relations in the 20th century, culminating in the 2018 provisional agreement addressing the appointment of bishops.<\/p>\n

In this essay, however, I focus primarily on my theoretical hypothesis and its justification.<\/p>\n

III. The Hypothesis<\/h3>\n

A common analogy for this topic is the so-called Ostpolitik[4]<\/sup>, or the Holy See\u2019s Eastern policy towards socialist states during the Cold War. My hypothesis posits that the limitations and opportunities in the diplomatic relations between the Holy See and the People’s Republic of China could be better understood not through a political lens but through a pre-political, political-theological approach. (By political theology, I mean that concepts appearing purely political at first glance often mirror theological systems and are thus comparable.[5]<\/sup>)<\/p>\n

This is especially pertinent because of the stark differences between the two regions and time periods, casting doubt on the effectiveness of the Ostpolitik analogy. For instance, Christianity in China lacks the political weight it had in the socialist bloc; the Chinese state treats religion as a security issue, not a political one. Moreover, communism in China functions more like a sinicized \u201csecular religion\u201d, increasingly aligned with millennia-old traditions and thought systems\u2014many of which conflict with the Church\u2019s universalist worldview.[6]<\/sup>\u00a0The notion of a secular religion here implies that a supposedly worldly, temporal phenomenon exhibits religious traits.<\/p>\n

Thus, while the Ostpolitik analogy cannot be ignored, I propose that the tension between inculturation and sinicization better defines the relationship. In this view, the dispute is not primarily political (as Ostpolitik would suggest) but pre-political, centered on the theological-cultural terms of inculturation and sinicization \u2013 terms which are then overlaid, and partly obscured, by political concerns.[7]<\/sup><\/p>\n

This would suggest that the relationship involves an atypical interreligious dialogue, with Catholicism being a traditional religion and the Chinese state representing, in theory, a secular religion.<\/p>\n

IV. The Tension Between Relativized Concepts<\/h3>\n

Given the centrality of inculturation and sinicization, both deserve brief explanation.<\/p>\n

Inculturation means that the Christian mission speaks to all cultures\u2014not to impose uniformity but to preserve and foster elements of each culture that do not contradict Christ\u2019s teachings, within the framework of the Gospel and unity with the universal Church. This is a slow, bottom-up, organic process that ties together human nature, culture, and grace. While present since the early Church and deeply rooted in Chinese Church-history as well (notably through Jesuit Matteo Ricci), the term was only clearly formulated in 1962 by Jesuit theologian Joseph Masson and later officially used by Pope John Paul II in his 1979 apostolic exhortation Catechesi Tradendae.<\/p>\n

Sinicization[8]<\/sup>, literally “to make Chinese,” has several meanings depending on context.[9]<\/sup>\u00a0Historically, it referred to the cultural dominance of the Han ethnicity or the assimilation of foreign dynasties like the Mongol Yuan or Manchu Qing. In modern usage, especially in Chinese government policy, it refers to the systematic alignment of foreign cultural and religious groups with the state\u2019s political objectives.[10]<\/sup>\u00a0President Xi Jinping explicitly discussed religious sinicization in a 2016 speech, stressing the leadership of the Communist Party and the importance of religions contributing to Chinese society\u2014within the bounds of the official atheist ideology. (China officially recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism.)<\/p>\n

Though similar in form, the two concepts are fundamentally different. Inculturation is a grassroots, tolerant, inclusive process; sinicization is top-down and politically mandated, often creating tensions.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, for the sake of dialogue, both concepts are being relativized. Cardinal Pietro Parolin, the Holy See\u2019s Secretary of State, remarked in an interview under Pope Francis:<\/p>\n

\u201cThese two concepts, ‘inculturation’ and ‘sinicization,’ refer to each other without being confused and without opposing one another: in some ways, they can complement each other and open the way to dialogue on religious and cultural levels.\u201d[11]<\/sup><\/p>\n

This supports the aforementioned pre-political approach, treating these concepts as elements of a dialogue between a traditional religion and a secular religion.[12]<\/sup><\/p>\n

V. Constraints and Opportunities<\/h3>\n

While both John Paul II and Benedict XVI prioritized the issue of Chinese Catholicism, formal progress came only under Pope Francis. The 2018 Provisional Agreement signed in Beijing is hard to assess, as its text remains secret due to diplomatic discretion.<\/p>\n

Still, official press releases confirm its existence and two-year term. Notably, the Holy See’s statement is much longer than China\u2019s, suggesting greater significance for the Vatican. The titles also differ: the Holy See speaks of an agreement \u201cregarding the appointment of bishops\u201d[13]<\/sup>, while China calls it an agreement \u201con relevant issues,\u201d a vaguer formulation.[14]<\/sup><\/p>\n

The agreement has been renewed three times\u2014most recently in 2024 for four years\u2014indicating both ongoing constraints and mutual interest.<\/p>\n

Reportedly, both sides consult on episcopal appointments, aiming for mutually acceptable candidates. However, bishops have been ordained without papal mandate even after the agreement, and some diocesan leadership changes have raised contradictions.<\/p>\n

Thus, interpretations of the agreement vary. From the Holy See\u2019s perspective, China has violated it repeatedly; from China\u2019s view, it is merely exercising sovereignty. Nevertheless, the Holy See continues to relativize sinicization in hopes of maintaining dialogue and unity.<\/p>\n

The official Chinese ideology, based in syncretic but now dogmatized Confucianism, permits inculturation only if sinicization is relativized\u2014something the Holy See does to preserve Church unity, despite criticism from figures like former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo[15]<\/sup>\u00a0and Cardinal Joseph Zen[16]<\/sup>\u00a0of Hong Kong.<\/p>\n

Paradoxically, the very constraint that limits relations may also be what allows for cautious cooperation. Still, it’s uncertain how this policy will affect Chinese Catholicism in the long run. Underground believers often feel alienated. In this sense, the Ostpolitik analogy may offer useful historical insight.<\/p>\n

Another major constraint is China’s dominant position. Its classical view of the state conflicts with the Holy See\u2019s \u201cforeign\u201d sovereignty, which it seeks to minimize\u2014even demanding that the Vatican sever ties with Taiwan, unlike with the U.S. in the 1970s.[17]<\/sup>\u00a0While China does not question the papacy\u2019s sovereignty, it wishes to limit its influence as much as possible.<\/p>\n

Looking ahead, the most likely scenario is that the current provisional agreement becomes permanent, though it remains uncertain whether open conflict can be avoided \u2013 especially given the Church\u2019s limited and distinct diplomatic tools in the region.<\/p>\n

Answering the paraphrased question of the Pharisees, posed in the essay title is therefore difficult: for China, the separation of religion and politics \u2013 of Church and state \u2013 remains uninterpretable in the Western sense. Ultimately, this explains the practical disputes over bishop appointments and the provisional agreement. Finally, it is important to mention, that my research was mainly a theoretical investigation of the topic, therefore it may be still be relevant under the new pope, Leo XIV, although it is too early to evaluate how he may address the question.<\/p>\n

VI. Bibliography<\/h3>\n